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GAYLORD V. UNITED STATES
595 F.3D 1364 (FED. CIR. 2010)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Gaylord v. United States, Frank Gaylord filed a copyright
infringement suit against the United States in the Court of Federal
Claims (CFC).' He alleged that the government violated his
copyright in a group of sculptures when it issued postage stamps
featuring a third party's image of the sculptures.2 The CFC found
the defendant not liable for copyright infringement because it
made fair use of the copyrighted work.' The court also determined
that the sculptures were not a work of joint authorship and that the
Architectural Works Copyright Protection Act (AWCPA) did not
apply to the copyrighted work.4
Gaylord appealed the fair use decision to the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC) and the United States
cross-appealed the court's findings concerning joint authorship and
the application of the AWCPA.' The CAFC reversed the fair use
decision, affirmed the determinations regarding joint authorship
and the AWCPA exemption, and remanded for a calculation of
damages.'
1. Gaylord v. U.S., 595 F.3d 1364, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
2. Id. at 1364.
3. Id. at 1371.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 1368.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
In 1986, Congress authorized the American Battle Monuments
Commission ("the Commission") to establish the Korean War
Veterans Memorial ("the Memorial") in honor of veterans of that
war.' The Commission sponsored a design contest, eventually
selecting a proposal for "38 larger-than-life granite soldiers in
formation."' The Army Corps of Engineers chose Cooper-Lecky
Architects, P.C. ("Cooper-Lecky") as the prime contractor to
supervise the process that would include creating, constructing,
and installing the Memorial.' In turn, Cooper-Lecky held a
competition to find a sculptor and awarded the project to
Gaylord."o
Cooper-Lecky and the United States, through the Department of
the Army, entered into an Architect-Engineer Contract on April
11, 1990." Notwithstanding the contractual terms pertaining to
copyright in sections 1-28 and 1-29, Cooper-Lecky and Gaylord
registered several copyrights while the project was underway.12
7. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1368.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. Gaylord was thus a sub-contractor under the prime contract between
Cooper-Lecky and the United States.
11. Id. at 1381. The Architect-Engineer Contract stated in section "1-28
Government Rights (Unlimited)": "the Government shall have unlimited rights,
in all drawings, designs, specifications, notes and other works developed in the
performance of this contract, including the right to use same on any other
Government design or construction without additional compensation to the
Contractor." Id. at 1382. In section "1-29 Drawings and Other Data Become
Property of Government," the contract stipulated: "All designs, drawings,
specifications, notes and other works developed in the performance of this
contract shall become the sole property of the Government." Id It also stated
"the Government shall be considered the 'person for whom the work was
prepared' for the purpose of authorship in any copyrightable work under 17
U.S.C. § 201(b)," the Copyright Act provision governing works made for hire.
Id.
12. Id. at 1383.
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The appellate record also noted various debates on the right to
profit from "peripheral commercial activity" and items such as
coffee mugs.13 In 1993, Cooper-Lecky informed Gaylord that the
Commission had withdrawn its claim for "copyright ownership
and/or royalties received from same."14 Subsequently, Cooper-
Lecky entered into an "Agreement for Copyright Licensing" with
Gaylord that allowed the artist to retain sole ownership of the
copyright for the sculptures and also acknowledged that Cooper-
Lecky was the sole author of the collective work, including the
individual soldier sculptures authored by the artist."
Before the final sculptures were cast in 1994, Cooper-Lecky and
Gaylord signed an agreement ("1994 Agreement") stating "the
copyright for this work will be held by the Artist Mr. Gaylord" and
indicating that the terms of use of the copyright were under a
separate contract.16 In 1995, Gaylord signed an agreement ("1995
Agreement") with Cooper-Lecky granting the firm royalty-bearing
licensing rights in the artist's copyrighted work." The 1995
Agreement described the Memorial as a collective work to which
both Cooper-Lecky and Gaylord separately contributed." Both the
1994 and 1995 Agreements identified Gaylord as "the sole author
of the soldier sculptures to become part of the overall Memorial." 9
Gaylord worked on the sculptures for five years, incorporating
the suggestions of various members of the Korean War Veterans
Memorial Advisory Board (VAB) and the Commission on Fine
Arts (CFA), among others.20 Working from the original design of
thirty-eight granite soldiers, he ultimately crafted nineteen
stainless steel soldiers in formation ("Column").2 1 From 1990 to
1995, Gaylord registered five copyrights for clay models of the
13. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1383.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1384.
16. Id. at 1380.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1380.
20. Id. at 1368-69.
21. Id. at 1368. The Column derives its name from the manner in which the
nineteen soldier sculptures represent a platoon in formation. For an image of
the Korean War Memorial, see http://www.nps.gov/kowa/index.htm.
2010] 187
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soldier sculptures in various stages of development, listing himself
as the sole author.22 After the sculptures were installed, Gaylord
filed another copyright registration for the artwork as it appeared
before and after casting.23
In January 1996, a photographer named John Alli took multiple
photographs of the Column after a snowstorm and decided to sell
the prints.24 He got permission from William Lecky, a partner of
Cooper-Lecky, who presented himself as the "outright" owner of
the copyright.25 They agreed on a 10% royalty on net sales.26
Lecky did not notify Gaylord of this arrangement.27
In 2002, the Postal Service issued a 37-cent commemorative
stamp honoring the 50th anniversary of the Korean War
armistice.2 8 It selected one of Alli's photos of the sculptures as the
image that would appear on the stamp and paid him $1,500.29 Alli
informed the Postal Service it would need to obtain the copyright
owner's permission and referred the Postal Service to Lecky.3 0
The stamp, featuring the Alli photograph, depicted 14 of the 19
soldiers that made up the Column.31  From 2002 until March 31,
2005, the Postal Service printed an estimated 86.8 million stamps,
generating over $17 million from the sale of almost 48 million
stamps.32 The Postal Service also sold various commemorative
frames and memorabilia and estimated that the sale of stamps used
solely for collecting generated $5.4 million in sales.33 The Postal
Service did not seek Gaylord's permission to use the soldier
sculptures in the stamps or memorabilia.34
22. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1369.
23. Id. The certificate of registration included photos of the sculptures after
they were installed on the National Mall. Id.
24. Id. at 1369-70.
25. Id. at 1370.
2 6. Id.
27. Id.
28. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1370. For an image of the postage stamp, see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/KoreanWarVeteransMemorial.
29. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1370.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1371.
33. Id.
34. Id.
188
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B. Procedural History
Gaylord sued the United States in the CFC for copyright
infringement." The government argued that the stamp constituted
fair use, that it had rights to the work as a joint author, and that the
stamp was included in the exemption for architectural works under
AWCPA."6 The CFC concluded the United States made fair use of
the copyrighted work, Gaylord was the sole copyright owner, and
the work did not qualify as an architectural work under AWCPA."
On appeal, Gaylord challenged the fair use decision and the
government challenged the determination regarding ownership and
the architectural exemption."
III. LEGAL ANALYSIS
The CAFC reviewed the legal conclusions of the lower court de
novo and its factual findings for clear error.39 Because the United
States agreed that Gaylord held a valid copyright in the Column
and that the stamp infringed, the issues on appeal focused on the
fair use defense, ownership rights through a joint author, and the
architectural exemption under AWCPA.4 0
A. Fair Use
The court began its discussion by reiterating that fair use was a
mixed question of law and fact that allowed "courts to avoid rigid
application of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would
stifle the very creativity which the law is designed to foster."4
35. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1371. Gaylord also sued Alli for copyright
infringement in 2006. Id. The parties settled, with Alli agreeing to pay Gaylord
10% of his net sales. Id.
3 6. Id.
3 7. Id.
3 8. Id.
39. Id. (citing Columbia Gas Sys., Inc. v. United States, 70 F.3d 1244, 1246
(Fed. Cir. 1995) for standards of review).
40. Id at 1372.
41. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1372 (citing Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,
510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994)).
2010] 189
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Fair use is a fact-based analysis of four factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including
whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the
copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted
work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted
work.42
1. Purpose and Character of the Use Was Not Sufficiently
Transformative
Examining the first factor, the purpose and character of the
infringing use, the court explored whether and to what extent the
new work was "transformative."4 3 The lower court concluded the
stamp was transformative because it provided a different
expressive character than the Column." It reasoned that the
photograph transformed the three-dimensional sculpture by using
subdued lighting and snow so as to leave the "viewer unsure
whether he is viewing a photograph of statues or actual human
beings."45 The CFC also concluded that the defendant further
transformed the photograph by "making it even grayer, creating a
nearly monochromatic image," which enhanced the surrealistic
effect.46
The CAFC disagreed, noting that the focus of the inquiry must
center on the purpose and character of the stamp, not the
42. Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107).
43. Id. Generally, the more a new work transforms and alters an original
creation, the more likely it will be deemed a fair use. "Transformative use is not
absolutely necessary for a finding of fair use," but "such works lie at the heart of
the fair use doctrine's guarantee of breathing spece within the confines of
copyright." Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1373.
46. Id.
190
6
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 7
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol21/iss1/7
GA YLORD V UNITED STATES
photograph.47 The court contrasted this case with Blanch v. Koons,
where a secondary use had a "sharply different" purpose than the
original work and could be labeled commentary or criticism, a fair
use.48 The court also compared the current use to Lennon v.
Premise Media Corp. where a secondary use was deemed
transformative based on its characterization as criticism.49
Here, the CAFC concluded the stamp did not transform the
character of the Column."o Light and snow may have altered the
sculptures' appearances, but unlike the uses in Blanch and Lennon,
these environmental conditions did not "impart a different
character to the work."" The court found that the stamp's surreal
character derived from the Column itself and cited the original
design's description of "dream-like presence of ghostly figures."52
The court concluded that "nature's decision to snow cannot
deprive Mr. Gaylord of an otherwise valid right to exclude.""
The CAFC also found the commercial nature of the use to weigh
against a finding of fair use.54 The defendant reported earning $17
million from selling nearly 48 million stamps and an estimated
$5.4 million in the sale of collectible stamps.
47. Gaylord, 595 F.3dat 1373.
48. Id. (citing Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d. Cir. 2006) (finding fair
use where incorporating a copyrighted photo into a collage as social criticism of
commercial images in consumer culture was sufficiently transformative)).
49. Id. See Lennon v. Premise Media Corp. 556 F. Supp. 2d 310 (S.D.N.Y.
2008) (finding fair use where the use of a 15-second clip of John Lennon's
"Imagine" in a film showing images of Stalin and the Cold War was deemed a
critique of the naivet6 of the song's message, and thus, sufficiently
transformative).
50. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1373.
51. Id at 1374.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. The CFC did not consider this facet of the purpose and character
factor, which inquires whether the "use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes." Id. (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107).
5 5. Id.
2010] 191
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2. The Column Was Sufficiently Expressive and Creative in
Nature
For the second factor of the fair use analysis, the court evaluated
the nature of the copyrighted work. 6 More specifically, the court
examined
(1) whether the work is expressive or creative, such
as a work of fiction, or more factual, with a greater
leeway being allowed to a claim of fair use where
the work is factual or informational, and (2)
whether the work is published or unpublished, with
the scope for fair use involving unpublished works
being considerably narrower."
The lower court recognized that while the expressive or creative
nature of the Column would normally weigh against finding fair
use, the expressive factor was discounted because the court
previously concluded the stamp was a transformative use,
following Blanch v. Koons." Because the CAFC previously
determined the stamp did not use the Column in a transformative
manner, it delegated full weight to the sculpture's expressive
nature.59 The court also decided the Column's overall expressive
and creative nature outweighed the fact that it was a national
monument and clearly published work.60
56. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1374.
57. Id. (citing Blanch, 467 F.3d at 256).
58. Id. In Blanch v. Koons the Second Circuit gave less weight to the
creative nature because the use was a "transformative manner to comment on
her image's social and aesthetic meaning rather than to exploit its creative
virtues." Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 257 (2d. Cir. 2006).
59. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1374. A finding of fair use is generally more
difficult where the original work is expressive or creative than where it is factual
or informational. Id. The scope for fair use is also greater for original works
that are published. Id.
60. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1374 (citing Twin Peaks Prods, Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l
Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366, 1376 (2d Cir. 1993)).
192
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3. Amount and Substantiality of Work Used Weighed Against Fair
Use
Taking up the third factor of the fair use analysis, the court
considered the amount and substantiality of the work used in
relation to the work as a whole - both a qualitative and
quantitative consideration.6 ' The CAFC agreed with the lower
court that the stamp's depiction of fourteen of the nineteen statues
used a substantial portion of the original work.62 It disagreed with
the lower court's finding that the photograph and stamp altered the
appearance of the Column so as to lessen the quality and
importance of the work in the stamp.63 Rather, the court
concluded, the Column was essentially the entire focus of the
stamp, which featured the soldier sculptures and was titled
"Korean War Veterans Memorial."' Thus, the court found the
third factor weighed against finding fair use.65
4. Market Impact Favored Fair Use
The last factor of the fair use analyzed by the court was the
market effect, or "the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work."66 The court found no clear
error in the lower court's decision that the stamp had not and
would not adversely affect Gaylord's subsequent marketing
efforts." The stamp was an inadequate substitute for the Column
and had not negatively affected plaintiffs previous endeavors to
market derivative works." In fact, Gaylord conceded the stamp
had actually increased the Column's value." Thus, the court
determined the fourth factor favored fair use.70
61. Id. at 1375.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1375 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 107).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
2010] 193
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After considering all four fair use factors, the CAFC concluded
the government's use of the Column in the stamp did not qualify
as a fair use." The court stated that allowing defendant to continue
to use the original creative work would be inconsistent with the
purposes of copyright law.72
B. Joint Authorship
The CAFC concluded the CFC correctly decided that the
Column was not a joint work.73 The Copyright Act provides that
"a joint work is a work prepared by two or more authors with the
intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole."74 Thus, the United States
had to prove the co-authors (1) made independently copyrightable
contributions to the work and (2) fully intended to be co-authors."
1. No Independent Copyrightable Contributions
The United States claimed joint authorship through the
contributions of Cooper-Lecky, the VAB and/or the CFA.76 The
government argued that since Cooper-Lecky granted it a license to
use any work to which Cooper-Lecky held a copyright, if either
Cooper-Lecky, the VAB, or the CFA were a joint author, the
government would have a right to use the Column.7
The CAFC agreed with the lower court that Gaylord was entitled
to a presumption of the validity of his copyright registration
because the certificate was made before or within five years after
first publication of the work, as mandated by statute." Despite the
71. Id. at 1376.
72. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1376.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1377 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1376.
77. Id. "[Elach contributor [to a work of joint authorship] automatically
acquires an undivided ownership in the entire work, including all of the
contributions contained therein. 1 Melville B. Nimmer & David Nimmer,
Nimmer on Copyright § 6.03 (Rev. Ed. 2010).
78. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1376.
194
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government's contention, the fact that the approval notations of a
federal commission appeared in certificate of registration's
"Nature of Authorship" rather than "Name of Author" section did
not undermine Gaylord's authorship claim." The CAFC found the
lower court properly treated the presumption of validity as
unrebutted, not unrebuttable.o Thus, the CAFC found no clear
error in presuming the validity of plaintiffs copyright or in the
treatment of the burden."
The CAFC agreed with the lower court's finding that
defendant's attempted analogy to the Supreme Court case, CCNV
v. Reid, failed.82 The CAFC noted that Cooper-Lecky's
contributions, such as the reflecting pool and landscaping, were
significantly absent from both plaintiffs copyright and the stamp,
so while the architectural firm may have contributed to the
Memorial, it did not contribute to the Column." The government
claimed that the CFA, VAB and Cooper-Lecky contributed to the
Column by suggesting different ethnicities for the soldiers, altering
the uniforms of the soldiers, and changing the soldiers' poses.84
The lower court concluded that while Gaylord created the Column
79. Id. The court rejected the government's challenge of the presumption of
the validity of the copyright registrations, stating that "approval - much like
comment and criticism - does not amount to authorship." Id.
80. Id. at 1376-77. The CAFC determined that the lower court fully
discussed the government's evidence before concluding that the defendant had
only proved that various groups offered suggestions and criticism, not
ownership, thereby leaving the presumption of validity unrebutted. Id. at 1376.
81. Id. at 1376-77.
82. Id. at 1378. In CCNV v. Reid, an organization contested the copyright
ownership of an artwork its members planned that was partly created by a
sculptor they commissioned orally and not in writing. CCNV v. Reid, 490 U.S.
730 (1989). The Supreme Court held the project was not a work made for hire
because the sculptor was an independent contractor and not an employee. Id. at
752. While the art was not a work made for hire, the Supreme Court noted joint
authorship was still possible if, on remand, evidence showed the organization
and sculptor prepared the work with the intention that their contributions
merged. Id. at 753.
83. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1378. While copyright law requires a preconcerted
common design to find joint authorship, the respective contributions by each
joint author need not be equal in quantity or quality. 1 Melville B. Nimmer &
David Nimmer, Nimmer on Copyright 6.03 (Rev. ed. 2010).
84. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1378.
1952010]
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using a VAB member's proposal to stagger the formation, such
claimed contributions evidenced suggestion and criticism rather
than joint authorship.
The CAFC found no clear error regarding these conclusions,
explaining that merely commissioning a work did not constitute
copyrightable expression." The CFA, VAB, and Cooper-Lecky
may have provided Gaylord with ideas, but ultimately Gaylord
alone "transformed those ideas into copyrightable expression.""
Here, the CAFC found no clear error in the lower court's decision
that the plaintiff was the sole author and sole owner of the
copyright."
2. Parties Did Not Fully Intend to Be Co-Authors
Additionally, the CAFC found no clear error with the conclusion
that Cooper-Lecky and the plaintiff did not intend the Column to
be a joint work." The lower court specifically noted the history of
the project showed an "open and contentious dispute regarding
copyright ownership," with Cooper-Lecky finally conceding that
Gaylord was the sole owner.90 The 1995 Agreement that addressed
the terms of use of the copyright characterized the Memorial as a
collective work and recognized contributions from both Cooper-
Lecky and Gaylord while repeating the 1994 Agreement's clause
that Gaylord was the sole author of the soldier sculptures.91
Though the government contended the 1995 Agreement could not
conclusively decide the question of authorship, the CAFC
85. Id. at 1379. Joint authorship requires one to make an independently
copyrightable contribution to the work, rather than merely participate by
contributing ideas or direction. Id. at 1377.
8 6. Id.
87. Id.
8 8. Id.
89. Id. See Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 140
F.2d 266 (2d Cir. 1944) , modified, 140 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1944) (holding that all
that is required for a joint authorship is that each author at the time he creates
his contribution intend that it shall constitute a part of a total work to which
another shall make, or already has made, a contribution).
90. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1379.
91. Id. at 1380.
196
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nonetheless found it "crystallized" the parties' intentions that were
also evident in the 1994 Agreement as well as their actions leading
up to the Column's creation.9 2 Here, too, the CAFC found no clear
error in the lower court's decision that the parties never intended a
joint work."
The majority took issue with the dissent's argument that the
United States could avoid liability for copyright infringement
either through its Architect-Engineer Contract with Cooper-Lecky
or 28 U.S.C. § 149894 because neither party filed a brief or
presented argument on those matters. 95 The majority noted that
Gaylord was not a party to the Architect-Engineer Contract used
by the dissent to free the government from liability; the sections
cited by the dissent concerned works Gaylord did not participate in
creating and addressed works for hire, an issue for which the
defendant presented no evidence. 96 Neither was the argument
based on 28 U.S.C. § 1498 valid because Gaylord did not work
97
with government materials or facilities or use government time.
The CAFC concluded this section by stating it found no clear error
in the lower court's determination that Gaylord had sole
authorship.9"
3. Architectural Exemption under A WCPA
The final issue before the CAFC was whether the Column was
an architectural work subject to the copyright liability exemption
for pictorial representations under AWCPA.9 9 An architectural
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. 28 U.S.C § 1498 bars copyright enforcement against the United
States if a copyrighted work was "prepared by a person while in the
employment or service of the United States... or in the preparation of which
Government time, material, or facilities were used..." Id. at 1383.
95. Id. at 1380.
96. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1380.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1380. The AWCPA reads: "The copyright in an architectural work
that has been constructed does not include the right to prevent the making,
distributing, or public display of pictures, paintings, photographs, or other
2010] 197
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work, according to the Copyright Act, is "the design of a building
as embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a
building, architectural plans, or drawings."oo
The lower court decided the Column was not a building as
defined by federal regulation.'0 ' Consequently, that court
reasoned, it was not an architectural work, but rather "an artistic
expression intended to convey a message rather than to be
occupied by individuals."l 02 The CAFC found no clear error with
this conclusion. 103
IV. DISSENT
The dissent disagreed with the majority decision that the
United States had no right to use an image of the Memorial for
governmental purposes and that Gaylord was entitled to damages
for copyright infringement." The Architect-Engineer Contract
entered into by the United States and Cooper-Lecky gave the
government "unlimited rights in all drawings, designs,
specifications, notes... including the right to use same on any other
government design or construction without additional
compensation to the contractor."o' The dissent noted that no
written instrument had been presented, as is required in the case of
a work for hire, and in fact, the government had consistently
declared its copyright ownership of the Memorial.'06
pictorial representations of the work, if the building in which the work is
embodied is located in or ordinarily visible from a public place." 17 U.S.C. §
120(a).
100. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1381 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101).
101. Id. The applicable federal regulation defines buildings as "humanly
habitable structures that are intended to be both permanent and stationary, such
as houses and office buildings, and other permanent and stationary structures
designed for human occupancy, including but not limited to churches, museums,
gazebos, and garden pavilions. Expressly excluded were "structures other than
buildings, such as bridges, cloverleafs, dams, walkways, tents, recreational
vehicles, mobile homes, and boats." 37 C.F.R. § 202.11(b)(2).
102. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1381.
10 3. Id.
104. Id. at 1386.
105. Id. at 1382 (citing contract DACA31-90-C-0057).
106. Id.
198
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Furthermore, 28 U.S.C. § 1498, the statute under which
Gaylord brought suit, provided that the contractor would not have
a right of action "with respect to any copyrighted work prepared
by a person while in the employment or service of the United
States... or in the preparation of which government time, material,
or facilities were used...""' The dissent argued that even if
Gaylord held a valid copyright, the statute prevented him from
enforcing it because as a subcontractor of Cooper-Lecky, Gaylord
was clearly working in the service of the United States.'o
With regard to the agreement between Cooper-Lecky and
the plaintiff that gave the artist "sole ownership," the dissent
pointed out that because neither the U.S nor any government
agency was a party, the agreement could not nullify the
government's rights either under a contract theory or 28 U.S.C. §
1498(b).o' Furthermore, the evidence at trial showed that after
Cooper-Lecky and Gaylord asked the government to relinquish its
rights, the government explicitly demanded assignment of the
"improperly registered copyrights.""o
The dissent maintained that the consideration of the
government's rights was proper because these issues were in fact
before the lower court and the record reflected all of the
contracts."' The dissent argued that a decision of such significant
public concern should not be decided by default."2
The dissent argued, with regard to the transformative
character of the fair use evaluation, that clear error had not been
107. Id. at 1383 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b)).
108. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1383.
109. Id. at 1384.
110. Id. Responding to both Cooper-Lecky and Gaylord, the Army's
Contracting Officer sent a Final Decision stating "[T]he contractor and all others
who might purport to derive copyrights with respect to work performed under
contract ... shall immediately cease and desist any communication or suggestion
to the public ... to the effect that there is a copyright on the Memorial or any
elements thereof." Id.
111. Id. In cases when the failure to raise aspects would constitute a
miscarriage of justice, a court may raise them sua sponte. Id. at 1385 (citing
Dorris v. Absher, 179 F.3d 420, 426 (6th Cir. 1999)).
112. Id. at 1385.
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shown in the lower court's factual findings."' Because the
government edited the photograph to emphasize the surreal effect
of the snow, and because a transformative work is generally
deemed a fair use of a copyrighted work, the dissent disagreed that
the United States was liable for copyright infringement."4 Citing
the government's concern that such a result would "unreasonably
and unfairly impact the end users of the Memorial" and "produce a
chilling effect on the public's ability to use the Memorial as
intended," the dissent concluded that the majority erred in finding
Gaylord was entitled to damages."'
V. FUTURE IMPLICATIONS
The result in Gaylord may give some readers pause for
seeming somewhat contrary to the policy behind public art. As the
Contracting Officer observed, the artist's ability to assert his
copyright would have a chilling effect on the public's ability to use
the Memorial as intended and unfairly impact the Memorial's end
users."ll6 After all, the Memorial and Column were built as a
result of Congressional initiative, and court records indicate that
the United States paid Gaylord $775,000 for his services."' One
possible alternative is for all government-commissioned art to be
in the public domain. Though the U.S. Postal Service made a
profit from stamp sales, presumably that revenue would go toward
providing mail delivery or other related functions that ultimately
benefit the public. Placing all government-commissioned art in
the public domain would clarify the identification of rights and
produce a more easily administrable rule; it may also better serve
the public interest by letting people freely enjoy and interact with
the art.
Implementing a policy whereby all government-
commissioned art would be in the public domain would remove an
artist's burden to vigilantly patrol the world for infringers and
113. Id.
114. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1385.
115. Id. at 1385-86.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 1383.
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consistently assert his or her copyright protection through
infringement suits. Mackie v. Hipple is a current example of active
copyright enforcement."' Jack Mackie created bronze shoeprints
buried in a sidewalk for the city of Seattle through the
municipality's Office of Art and Cultural Affairs."' Years later,
Mike Hipple took a photograph of the art with a woman's foot in
the frame and sold it to a stock agency.'20 Mackie discovered this
and sent Hipple a cease-and-desist letter, with which Hipple and
the company promptly complied.' 2 ' A year later, Mackie sued
Hipple for copyright infringement and statutory damages.122 The
case is currently pending in the Western District of Washington
after the judge denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment.123
To some, the infringement suit may seem the typical
example of an artist properly asserting his rights, but to others, it
may seem more akin to overzealous copyright enforcement.124
Hipple promptly complied with Mackie's request to take down the
photograph, yet Mackie filed suit one year later demanding
damages. 125 Considering that the alleged infringement was
nominal compared to what the pending litigation will ultimately
cost in court resources, is this what copyright law should be
encouraging? 26
118. Mackie v. Hipple, No. C09-0164RSL, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82462
(W.D. Wash. 2010).
119. Jen Graves, The Case(s) of the Broadway Dance Steps, SLOG, Feb. 3,
2010, http://slog.thestranger.com/slog/archives/2010/02/03/the-cases-of-the-
broadway-dance-steps. See also Mike Masnick, Artist Sues Photographer For
Transformative Photo Of Public Artwork, Even Though Photographer Took
Down The Photo, TECHDIRT, Feb. 4, 2010, http://www.techdirt.com/blog.
php?tag=mike+hipple&edition=techdirt.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Mackie, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82462 at *6.
124. See Jseattle, Broadway sidewalk dance art causing another legal two-
step, CAPITOL HILL SEATTLE, Feb. 3, 2010, http://www.capitolhiliseattle.
com/2010/02/03/broadway-sidewalk-dance-art-causing-another-legal-two-step.
125. See id.
126. Mackie, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82462 at *3 (noting that Hipple claims
he made $60 from sales of the allegedly infringing photograph).
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Without the extra revenue from copyright licensing fees,
maintaining government-commissioned public domain art would
be a concern. One possibility is for the National Parks Service to
take over the upkeep, as they did with the Korean War Veterans
Memorial. Another option is for a local cultural affairs department
to assume the responsibilities of maintaining a particular work.
These alternatives may ultimately be more successful because
relying on the copyright license's royalties to fund maintenance
has sometimes interfered with the public's ability to enjoy the
artwork. For example, the city of Chicago owns an exclusive
license for the Cloud Gate sculpture'2 7 and, for a period, required
all photographers to buy a permit.'2 8 In 2005, security guards
stopped a professional photographer from taking photos of the
sculpture without a permit.129  This policy seemed far from
facilitating the public's interaction with "the Bean," even though
the city was apparently using the revenue from its exclusive
license to fund the sculpture's maintenance.'30 The city of Chicago
has since modified its policy and now only requires movie-
producers and wedding photographers to purchase permits."'
Given the result in Gaylord, the government will likely
carefully consider the disposition of all of its ownership rights in
future contracts with artists. By dividing rights up front through
assignment, the government could avoid the dispute that led to
litigation in this case. In one scenario, the government could
reserve the right to use derivative works of the art in government-
127. For a photo of the sculpture affectionately known as "the Bean," see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CloudGate.
128. Kelly Kleiman, Who Owns Public Art?, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE
MONITOR, Mar. 30, 2005, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/
2005/0330/pl5sOl-usju.pdf.
129. Ben Joravsky, The Bean Police: The city's charging some
photographers hundreds of dollars to take pictures in Millenium Park, CHICAGO
READER, Jan. 27, 2005, available at http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/the-
bean-police/Content?oid=917867. Professional photographers must buy a $325
media press to shoot for one day in any city park, while wedding photographers
are charged $50 per hour to shoot in Millenium Park. Id.
130. Kleiman, supra note 128.
131. Deanna Isaacs, Got a Permit for That Painting?, CHICAGO READER,
July 24, 2008, available at http://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/got-a-permit-
for-that-painting/Content?oid=1 109157.
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related works, such as a stamp issued by the Postal Service. 13 2 The
government could separately contract with the prime contractor
and the artist to ensure that no rights were overlooked in previous
agreements with multiple parties. This direct treatment would
allow an artist and the government to tailor the contract so that
each party clearly understood the division of rights and felt
comfortable with the arrangement.
Such an agreement would not likely affect the quality of
artists attracted to public art projects, because while fewer
established artists may be willing to relinquish some of their rights,
there is no reason "new" artists would be less talented. In fact, this
arrangement might even serve to discover new talent. The
opportunity for participants to gain name recognition and build
their reputations while collaborating on public art projects would
be a great incentive for emerging artists.
Ultimately, Gaylord intended to remain loyal to the purpose
of copyright law by allowing an artist to assert his copyright.
However, taking into consideration the quantity and nature of
litigation it has launched, one may wonder whether the purpose of
providing an incentive to innovation is truly achieved by current
formulations of copyright. Perhaps putting government-
commissioned art in the public domain or mandating assignment
of rights upfront may ultimately better serve artists and the public.
VI. CONCLUSION
The CAFC in Gaylord v. United States reversed the CFC's fair
use finding, affirmed the conclusions that the defendant did not
have rights as a joint owner and the Column was not an
architectural work governed by the AWCPA, and remanded for a
determination of damages.133
Placing government-commissioned art in the public domain
would be an unambiguous way to avoid future copyright
infringement disputes. If parties can agree to divide rights upfront
132. This example supposes the Postal Service is a full as opposed to a quasi-
governmental agency, though it is actually organized as an "independent
establishment of the executive branch of the government." 39 U.S.C. § 201.
133. Gaylord, 595 F.3d at 1381.
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through assignment, such a contract will serve to reassure both an
artist and a government agency that their rights will not be
challenged in court.
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